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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3) (j) . This matter was 
assigned to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to § 78-2-2(4) of 
the Utah Code. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Appellees, Matt Mattson and Sherie Mattson (hereinafter 
"Mattsons") disagree with the standards of review as presented 
for the issues in Appellant Promax Development Corporation's 
(hereinafter "Promax") appellant brief. 
1. Issue: Whether a valid contract existed between Defendants, 
the Mattsons, and the potential buyers of the Mattsons' 
home, the Johnsons. Standard of Review: Whether a 
contract existed is a question of fact and the appellate 
court will not overturn a trial court's factual findings 
unless they are clearly erroneous. Cal Wadsworth Constr. v. 
City of St. George, 898 P.2d 1372 (Utah 1995). The 
appellant must also marshall the evidence in favor of the 
prevailing party and show the facts are clearly erroneous. 
Reinbold v. Utah Fun Shares, 850 P.2d 482 (Ut. App. 1993). 
2. Issue: Assuming that no contract for sale existed between 
the Mattsons and the Johnson, whether Promax tortiously 
interfered with the sales contract between the Mattsons and 
the Johnsons. Standard of Review: When questioning the 
trial court's finding that a contract existed, a clearly 
erroneous standard of appellate review applies, due regard 
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to 
judge the credibility of the witnesses, and the evidence 
will be reviewed in a light most favorable to the trial 
court's findings and affirmed if there is a reasonable basis 
for doing so. Reinbold v. Utah Fun Shares. 850 P.2nd 487 
(Ut. App. 1993). The appellant must marshall all the 
evidence in support of the findings in order to demonstrate 
the evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings. Reinbold 
v. Utah Fun Shares. 850 P.2nd 487 (Ut. App. 1993). 
3. Issue: Whether acts of an individual can be construed as 
tortiously interfering with a contract, assuming a counter 
offer had expired. Standard of Review: When questioning 
the trial court's finding that a contract existed, a clearly 
erroneous standard of appellate review applies, due regard 
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to 
judge the credibility of the witnesses, and the evidence 
will be reviewed in a light most favorable to the trial 
court's findings and affirmed if there is a reasonable basis 
for doing so. Reinbold v. Utah Fun Shares, 850 P.2nd 487 
(Ut. App. 1993). The appellant must marshall all the 
evidence in support of the findings in order to demonstrate 
the evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings. Reinbold 
v. Utah Fun Shares. 850 P.2nd 487 (Ut. App. 1993). 
Issue: Whether a mechanic's lien was filed wrongfully. 
Standard of Review: When questioning the trial court's 
finding that a lien was wrongfully filed, a clearly 
erroneous standard of appellate review applies, due regard 
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to 
judge the credibility of the witnesses, and the evidence 
will be reviewed in a light most favorable to the trial 
court's findings and affirmed if there is a reasonable basis 
for doing so. Reinbold v. Utah Fun Shares. 850 P.2nd 487 
(Ut. App. 1993). The appellant must marshall all the 
evidence in support of the findings in order to demonstrate 
the evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings. 
Reinbold v. Utah Fun Shares. 850 P.2nd 487 (Ut. App. 1993). 
Issue: Whether the trial court properly refused to grant a 
motion for a partial new trial. Standard of Review: 
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
prevailing party, the Appellate Court must conclude that the 
evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. Heslop v. 
Bank of Utah. 839 P.2d 828 (Utah 1992). When the challenge 
is an attack on the sufficiency of the evidence, the 
appealing party must marshall the evidence which supports 
the verdict and show that it is insufficient to support the 
verdict. Id. 
Issue: Whether the trial court was clearly erroneous in 
finding that the value of the Defendants' home was 
$390,000.00. Standard of Review: When reviewing a trial 
court's finding of fact, a clearly erroneous standard of 
appellate review applies, due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of 
the witnesses, and the evidence will be reviewed in a light 
most favorable to the trial court's findings and affirmed if 
there is a reasonable basis for doing so. Reinbold v. Utah 
Fun Shares, 850 P.2nd 487 (Ut. App. 1993). The appellant 
must marshall all the evidence in support of the findings in 
order to demonstrate the evidence, including all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the 
findings. Reinbold v. Utah Fun Shares. 850 P.2nd 487 (Ut. 
App. 1993). 
7. Issue: Whether the trial court's judgment was supported by 
the evidence. Standard of Review: When questioning the 
trial court's finding of fact a clearly erroneous standard 
of appellate review applies, due regard shall be given to 
the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility 
of the witnesses, and the evidence will be reviewed in a 
light most favorable to the trial court's findings and 
affirmed if there is a reasonable basis for doing so. 
Reinbold v. Utah Fun Shares, 850 P.2nd 487 (Ut. App. 1993). 
The appellant must marshall all the evidence in support of 
the findings in order to demonstrate the evidence, including 
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient 
to support the findings. Reinbold v. Utah Fun Shares, 850 
P.2nd 487 (Ut. App. 1993). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Rule 8, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 59(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 60(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment from the Third District 
Court of Utah, District Court Judge J. Dennis Frederick, 
presiding. Plaintiff, builder of Defendants7 home, sued 
Defendants for breach of contract alleging that Defendants had 
failed to pay the total cost of construction. Defendant 
counterclaimed for, among other things, breach of contract, 
alleging cost over runs by Plaintiff and faulty workmanship, and 
interference with contractual relationship, alleging tortious 
interference by Plaintiff with a contract for sale of Defendants' 
home to a third party. Judge Frederick found in favor of 
Defendants and awarded judgment against Plaintiff and in favor of 
Defendants in the amount of $193,000.00, plus costs. The 
judgment consisted of $170,000.00 for tortious interference with 
contract (the difference between the value of the home at the 
time of completion and the contract sales price to the third 
party), and $23,000.00 for faulty workmanship. Judge Frederick 
did not award punitive damages or attorney's fees. Plaintiffs 
appeal from this judgment. 
Although Judge Frederick found that a fixed cost contract 
existed between Plaintiff and Defendants, he did not awarded 
damages to Defendants for the difference between the contract 
price ($192,000.00) and the price actually paid by Defendants 
($330,000.00). Defendant cross appeal from this failure of the 
trial court to awarded damages. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
FACTS AS FOUND BY THE TRIAL COURT 
1. Promax (hereinafter Plaintiff) is a Utah Corporation in good 
standing in the State of Utah, and is in the business of 
building homes and developing properties. R. 403. 
2. Phil Bates was, at all times relevant to the facts in this 
case, acting as Plaintiff's agent. R. 403. 
3. In April, 1993, Phil Bates approached Defendants and 
offered, on behalf of Plaintiff, to build a home for 
Defendants. R. 403-04. 
4. The contract price for building the home was $190,200.00— 
plus $29,000.00, which equals one half the price of the 
building lot. R. 404. 
5. Culley Davis, Plaintiff's president, acknowledged in his 
deposition that he was aware that the "basic price was about 
$195,000.00," while at trial he insisted that the contract 
was cost plus. R. 404. 
6. Defendants obtained a construction loan from Far West Bank, 
through Far West Bank's agent Mark Baraclaugh. R. 404. 
7. Mark Baraclaugh, Promax' banker, testified that Defendant's 
home was to be built for a certain dollar figure. R. 404. 
8. Baraclaugh also testified that a cost plus building contract 
was rare and that the bank would not have agreed to lend 
Defendants' money had the home been given an open-ended 
arbitrary price. R. 404. 
On April 15th, 1993, the loan was closed. R. 404. 
Plaintiff built the home and Defendants paid Plaintiff the 
contract price with the monies obtained from Far West Bank. 
R. 404. 
Defendants were involved in the usual way in selecting 
materials for their home. R. 404. 
As construction proceeded, Plaintiff did not properly pay 
for all labor and materials as the contract required. R 
404-05. 
As a direct result of Plaintiff's failure to properly pay 
for those costs, and in order to avoid having liens placed 
on their home, Defendants were forced to pay those costs 
from their own funds in the amount of $140,000.00 dollars. 
R. 405. 
Defendants paid approximately $140,000.00 more than called 
for due to Plaintiff's failure to keep them apprised of the 
overage, thus breaching the contract. R. 405. 
Phil Bates told Defendants throughout the building project 
that Defendant's were within their budget. R. 405. 
Plaintiff was paid in full for all materials and labor 
supplied to or performed on Defendants home. R. 405. 
Defendants owe Plaintiff nothing. R. 405. 
The value of the home, when finished, was $390,000.00. R. 
405. 
While the home was being built, Plaintiff never obtained any 
change orders from Defendants. R. 405. 
While the home was being built, Plaintiff never told 
Defendants of any cost over runs. R. 405. 
21. When the home was completed, Defendants received an offer 
from a ready, willing and able buyer, to purchase the home 
for $560,000.00 dollars. R. 405. 
22. Plaintiff, through agent Phil Bates, represented to various 
third persons that Plaintiff was Defendants' selling agent. 
R. 405. 
23. Defendants told Bates that Plaintiff was not allowed to act 
as their selling agent. R. 406 
24. Plaintiff, through Bates, told Defendants that Plaintiff 
"would kill their deal" if they did not use Plaintiff as 
their real estate agent in the sale of their home. R. 406. 
25. Defendants refused to allow Plaintiff to act as selling 
agent. R. 406. 
26. Because of Defendant's proper refusal to allow Plaintiff to 
act as agent in the sale of Defendant's home, Bates and 
Plaintiff had five material men and laborers wrongfully file 
liens against Defendant's home to scare off the buyer. R. 
406. 
27. These wrongfully filed liens were the sole reason that the 
buyer suddenly backed out of the contract to buy Defendant's 
home. R. 406. 
28. As a direct result of Plaintiff's wrongfully liening 
Defendant's home, Defendants suffered $170,000.00 in 
damages, because of the loss of sale. R. 406. 
29. On two other occasions Bates engaged in the so-called cost-
plus versus fixed price bait and switch action. Rick and 
Martha Riley testified that after Bates' involvement with 
Defendants, they had Bates in 1993, build their home with 
the understanding that they had a fixed price agreement of 
$300,000.00. There was no written agreement. After the 
Rileys paid their $300,000.00, Bates demanded an additional 
$160,000.00 for extras. The Rileys finally paid Bates an 
additional $30,000.00 just to be rid of the problem. Bates 
had threatened the Rileys that if they did to him what the 
Mattsons did, he would "burn them" as he had the Mattsons. 
R. 406-07. 
Selva Kumaraa testified that Bates built his home before 
March of 1994. After closing, when everything was paid, 
Bates demanded more money. He harassed Kumaraa to the point 
where Kumaraa paid him an additional $600.00—again to get 
rid of the problem. Exhibit 57 is the cancelled check 
endorsed by Phil Bates dated August 12th, 1994. The Kumaraa 
budget was for $100,000.00 and the overage was an additional 
$13,000.00. There was again no written contract. R. 407. 
Plaintiff gave Defendants a one year warranty for anything 
that might go wrong with their home relating to anything 
built on their home, while Plaintiff was the general 
contractor. R. 407. 
After Plaintiff completed Defendants7 home, numerous 
deficiencies appeared which were brought to Bate's 
attention, Exhibit 67, within the one-year warranty period. 
With the exception of the faulty rain gutters, nothing was 
corrected. The costs of repairs is $23,000.00. Defendant 
have paid the various overages and the lien holders, 
Exhibits 58 and 62, which are the lien waivers. R. 407-08. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court found that after Plaintiff had completed the 
construction of the Mattsons' home, that the Mattsons found a 
buyer, the Johnsons. The Court found that the Mattsons and the 
Johnsons entered into a contract for sale, where the Johnsons 
agreed to purchase the Mattsons' home for $560,000.00. The Court 
found that Phil Bates, Promax's agent, had five material men and 
laborers wrongfully file liens against Defendant's home to scare 
off the buyer. These wrongfully filed liens were the sole reason 
that the buyer suddenly backed out of the contract to buy 
Defendant's home. As a direct result of Plaintiff's wrongfully 
liening Defendant's home, Defendants suffered $170,000.00 in 
damages, because of the loss of sale. On appeal, and for the 
first time, Plaintiff's asserts that the sales contract between 
the Mattsons and the Johnsons never existed, and that, therefore, 
there could have been no tortious interference by Bates with the 
sales contract. The evidence presented at trial, however, 
overwhelmingly supports the trial court's finding that a sales 
contract between the Mattsons and the Johnsons did exists. In 
fact, Plaintiff never challenged the existence of the sales 
contract at trial. Furthermore, Plaintiff misstates the standard 
of review in its brief, and fails to marshall the evidence as 
required when challenging a trial court's finding. The evidence 
at trial was so overwhelming, and unchallenged, that it would 
have been an abuse of discretion had the trial court concluded 
that not contract existed. The trial court's finding, therefore, 
was not clearly erroneous and should be affirmed. 
The sales contract between the Mattsons and the Johnsons was 
in writing. The contract, however, when presented at trial was 
not complete; several pages were missing. The completeness of 
the contract for sale was supported by Mr. Mattson's testimony, 
which Plaintiff never challenged at trial. On appeal, and for 
the first time, Plaintiff argues that, because the actual 
contract presented at trial was incomplete, the contract was not 
in writing and, therefore, violates the statute of frauds. In 
its brief, Plaintiff again misstates the standard of review and 
fails to marshall the evidence. But more important, Plaintiff 
failed to raise the affirmative defense of statue of frauds in 
its pleadings, or at trial. Plaintiff, therefore, waived that 
affirmative defense. Moreover, even if there had been no 
contract, the trial court could have found that Plaintiff 
interfered with Defendants' economic relations, and the resulting 
judgment would have been the same. The trial court's finding, 
therefore, was not clearly erroneous, and should be affirmed. 
The trial court found that Phil Bates, Promax's agent, 
tortiously interfered with Defendants' sales contract by having 
five material men and laborers wrongfully file liens against 
Defendant's home to scare off the buyer. These wrongfully filed 
liens were the sole reason that the buyer suddenly backed out of 
the contract to buy Defendant's home. On appeal, and for the 
first time, Plaintiff argues that the liens could not have been 
wrongfully filed because Plaintiff's had not first made a demand 
for payment. Again, Plaintiff misstates the standard of review 
and fails to marshall the evidence. Furthermore, Plaintiff fails 
to comprehend that the trial court did not rely on the mechanics 
lien statute but on the common law claim of tortious interference 
with contract. Had the trial court relied on the statute, treble 
damages would have resulted. The trial court found that filing 
the liens against the Mattsons' home was the act that constituted 
the tortious interference with the Mattsons sale contract. The 
evidence at trial supported the trial court's finding that the 
liens were filed in order to scare off the buyer. The trial 
court's finding, therefore, was not clearly erroneous and should 
be affirmed. 
The trial court found that the wrongfully filed liens were 
the sole reason that the buyer suddenly backed out of the 
contract to buy Defendant's home. Plaintiff argues that this is 
not true and relies on affidavits submitted after the trial. 
Plaintiff accuses Defendant Matt Mattson of perjury but, again, 
fails to marshall the evidence. The evidence at trial, including 
Phil Bates admission, supported the trial court's finding that 
Bates had the liens filed to prevent the Mattsons from selling 
their home to the Johnsons. The trial court's finding, 
therefore, was not clearly erroneous, and should be affirmed. 
The trial court found that the value of the Mattsons' home, 
at the time of completion, was $390,000.00. The trial court also 
found that the Mattsons had a ready and willing buyer, the 
Johnsons, who had contracted to purchase their home for 
$560,000.00. The trial court found that Promax committed 
tortious interference of contract by filing liens against the 
Mattsons home and scaring off the Johnsons. The trial court 
awarded judgment against Plaintiff and in favor of the Mattsons 
in the amount of $170,000.00, the difference between the value at 
time of completion and the sales contract price. On appeal, and 
for the first time, Plaintiff argues that the trial court's 
finding that the value of the home was $390,000.00 was in error, 
that the home was actually worth much more, and that the 
judgment, therefore was excessive. Plaintiff bases this argument 
on the fact that Mattson testified that his home was worth about 
$380,000.00 at the time of completion, and that Mattson could not 
be a credible witness. Plaintiff also relies on Utah State Road 
Commission v. Johnson, 550 P2d. 216, 220 (Utah 1976) for the 
proposition that a homeowner is not competent to testify 
regarding the value of his own home. However, Plaintiff 
misstates the holding of that case. The Court in Utah actually 
held that a homeowner was competent to testify regarding the 
value of his home if he was familiar with the facts which gave 
the property value. The evidence presented at trial demonstrates 
that Mattson was intimately involved with the construction of his 
home. The trial court states that Mattson was acting a co-
contractor. Furthermore, the trial court did not rely 
exclusively on Mattsons testimony. Even Plaintiff's own 
witnesses agreed with Mattson on the value of the home at the 
time of completion. Moreover, Plaintiff has again misstated the 
standard of review and has failed to marshall the evidence. The 
evidence presented at trial was unchallenged and supported the 
trial court's finding• The trial court's finding was not clearly 
erroneous and should be affirmed. 
The trial court found that the contract price for building 
Defendants7 home was $190,200.00—plus $29,000.00, which equals 
one half the price of the building lot. On appeal, Plaintiff 
asserts that the contract was a cost-plus contract. Plaintiff 
again misstates the standard of review and fails to marshall the 
evidence. The only evidence presented in its brief are 
affidavits obtained after the trial was over. The evidence at 
trial supported the trial court's finding and it should be 
affirmed. 
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court's judgment is not 
supported by the evidence. Plaintiff again misstates the 
standard of review and fails to marshall the evidence. This 
final argument is redundant, irrelevant or diminimus and should 
not be considered by the Court. 
After the trial, Plaintiff requested a new trial, which was 
denied. Plaintiff misstates the standard of review and fails to 
marshall the evidence, again. The trial court's findings were 
supported by substantial evidence at trial. The "new" evidence 
which Plaintiff sought to introduce at a new trial could have 
been presented at trial, but Plaintiff chose not to. The trial 
court was well within its discretion in not granting a new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT FOUND THAT THERE EXISTED A CONTRACT FOR SALE 
BETWEEN MATTSONS AND BUYER AND THAT PHIL BATES, PROMAX'S 
AGENT, TORTIOUSLY INTERFERED WITH THAT CONTRACT. 
Promax alleges that there was no valid contract between 
Mattsons and Curtis Johnson because there was no acceptance of 
the offer from Curtis Johnson. This argument fails for three 
reasons: (1) Promax misstates the standard of review. Promax is 
challenging a finding of fact and not a question of law. A trial 
court's finding of fact cannot be set aside unless it is found to 
be clearly erroneous. (2) When challenging a trial court's 
finding of fact (in this case: that a contract did exist) 
Plaintiff's are required to marshall the evidence on appeal, and 
they have failed to do so. (3) Promax's assertion that a 
contract for sale never existed is being raised for the first 
time on appeal, and may not, therefore, be presented to this 
Court. (4) Even if the Court were to consider Promax's assertion 
that a contract never existed, the only evidence presented at 
trial supported the trial Court's finding that a contract did 
exist; the existence of a contract was never challenged. For the 
Court to have concluded otherwise would have been an abuse of 
discretion. 
Promax alleges that as a matter of law there was no contract 
because it wasn't accepted. However, Promax fails to provide any 
case law to support its position and has misstated the standard 
of review. The question of whether a contract exists or not is a 
question of fact: 
A trial court's finding about whethei a party 
accepted an offer or a counteroffer is a 
finding of fact. We cannot overturn a trial 
court's factual findings unless they are 
clearly erroneous. A finding is clearly 
erroneous if it is "against the clear weight 
of evidence, or if the appellate court 
otherwise reaches a definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been made." 
Cal Wadsworth Constr. v. Citv of St. George, 898 P.2d 1372 (Utah 
1995) . 
Additionally, the appellant must marshall the evidence in 
favor of the prevailing party and show the facts are clearly 
erroneous. Reinbold v. Utah Fun Shares, 850 P.2d 482 (Ut. App. 
1993). Appellant has failed to marshall the evidence and has 
cited to no evidence to support its assertion that a contract did 
not exist. 
This argument is now presented to the appellate court for 
the first time and was not brought before the trial court. It is 
well established that: "matters not put in issue before the trial 
court may not be raised for the first time on appeal" Wade v. 
Stangl, 869 P.2nd 232 (Ut. App. 1994). The Court, therefore, 
need not consider Promax/s argument. 
The trial court did find that there existed a contract for 
sale between Mattsons and the buyer Curtis Johnson. (R. 403-
409). Promax never, at any time, challenged the existence of a 
contract for sale. The only evidence presented at trial was that 
there did exist a contract for sale, for example: 
1. Phil Bates, Plaintiff's agent, testified: 
a. "...we were able to obtain a purchaser..." (R. 514, 
L17-20). 
b. "I am aware of an offer..." (R. 511, L25). 
c. Q. "In your deposition you say that you had a buyer 
ready, willing and able to buy Matt Mattson's home, 
correct?" A. "I did not, but another agent did, yes." 
Q. "You did not say that you had a ready, willing and 
able buyer for Matt Mattson'S home in your deposition?" 
A." May have said. I did that, but it was representing 
as we agreed on the Listing <3f the home and I was at 
that point ready to submit an offer in writing." COURT: 
"You've lost me." WITNESS: "yeah." THE COURT: "Why 
don't you listen to the guestion and answer the 
guest ion. Did you say that or didn't you say that?" THE 
WITNESS: "I believe I did." (R- 536, L8-21). 
d. Q. (By Mr. Smith) "Okay. Did you see this ~ what 
appears to be a contract for the sale of a home for 
$565,000 by a company that you are affiliated with, 
broker? A. "I have seen it [the contract] after the 
sale did not go through." (R. 546 L15-18). 
e. Q. "Did you ever say to Laurie Gale, 'This deal's not 
going to close because I burned it by liening it, 
liening the property'?" A. "Not in those words, no." 
(R. 547, L16-19). 
f. "If I was going to represent that house as a listing 
agent, yes, I would have been entitled to a 
commission." (R. 548, L13-15)• 
g. "I was angry with Matt when he wouldn't sign a listing 
agreement which we verbally agreed to and before the 
offer was. presented, X believe- that, offer was. ores.eivted 
to him on a Monday." (R. 559, L13-16). 
h. Q. "Well, when the home was finished, wasn't the 
market value of the home $450,000.00?" A. "We, I 
believe, had an offer for five — what do you show — 
565?" Q. "Five Sixty Five." A. "What somebody's 
willing to pay us, that would be what it's worth . . 
." (R. 586 L3-9). 
i. Q. "...In your deposition you said that you had a 
buyer who was ready, willing and able to buy Mr. 
Mattson's home, correct?" A. "I had one presented to me 
that I represented to Mattson to our earlier 
conversation." Q. "Right, but that person, the words 
you used were ready, willing and able, correct?" A. "I 
believe, yes." Q. "And that was a person who made the 
$550,000 offer, correct?" A. "Yes." (R. 732, L19-R. 
733-4) 
Martha Riley testified: 
a. Phil Bates admitted to Martha Riley that Matt had sold 
his home and that Phil had "burned the deal." (R. 598-
99, "R. 609) . 
Matt Mattson testified: 
a. Q. "Now, during the Parade of Homes, do you know if 
there was a person who wanted to buy your home?" A. 
"Yes." Q. Do you know what that person's name was?" A. 
"It was Curtis Johnson.." (R. 645, L18-22). 
b. Phil Bates admitted to Mr Mattson: "I told you if you 
don't pay me the commission, I'd kill your deal." (R. 
651, L12-13). 
c. Q. (Mr. Braunberger) "Was there a signed addendum where 
you agreed to things?" A. "There may have been so—" 
Q. "What was the final agreement? You'd sell for a 
hundred and fifty thousand?" A. "Five hundred and 
fifty." Q. "Five hundred and fifty thousand without 
furniture?" A. "Correct, yeah, that was the 
difference." Mr. Braunberger: "Your Honor, may I see 
that exhibit?" The Court: "Yes you may." Q. "I show 
you paragraph no. 1 where it lists matt Mattson and 
Promax as sellers." A. "Uh-huh (affirmative)." Q. 
Can you explain that? A. Yeah. Actually, Phil Bates 
tried to sell my home to this Mr. Johnson, somehow 
claiming it was his home. He'd actually stipulated on 
page 3 that he was the — representing that he had a 
written agreement to sell the home, so I did not fill 
any of this in at all. Q. Is that cleared up in 
subsequent documents you don't have with you today?" 
A. It may have been. It probably was. In fact, in 
fact, I thought they had scratched it out so — " (R. 
698 L21 to R. 699-L19). 
d. Q. "Relating to the sale to Curtis Johnson, did you 
ever sign the Earnest Money Agreement?" A. "YES" Q. 
"Was there a counter offer?" A. "From him there was a 
counter offer, yes." Q. "Did you accept that counter 
offer?" A. "We did, yes." Q. "So you had a binding 
contract?" A. "I guess so, Yes." (R. 696 L23-697-L6). 
4. Culley Davis, Plaintiff's agent testified: 
a. A. "Well, we had a purchaser for 440(sic) grand, but he 
didn't want to pay the commission fee to my partner of 
that and that fell through, too." (R766, L24 to 767-
Ll) . 
The trial court found there was sufficient evidence to show that 
a contract existed. In fact, the only evidence presented at 
trial supported the Court's finding; Plaintiff never challenged 
the existence of the sales contract at trial. For the trial 
court to have concluded that a contract did not exist, would have 
been an abuse of discretion. The Court's finding that a contract 
for sale existed between the Mattsons and the Johnsons should 
not, therefore, be set aside. 
II. PROMAX WAIVED THE DEFENSE OF STATUTE OF FRAUDS BY FAILING TO 
PLEAD IT. 
Promax's next argument is in three parts: (1) Promax 
asserts that the written sales contract between the Mattsons and 
the Johnsons, when introduced into evidence at trial, was missing 
an addendum; therefore, according to Promax, a written contract 
never existed. (2) Promax then relies on the statute of frauds 
asserting that because there was no written contract, the 
contract between the Mattsons and the Johnsons was invalid. (3) 
Promax then asks the Court to conclude that the trial court erred 
in finding that Bates tortiously interfered with the contract 
because the contract did not exist. Promax's three part argument 
fails at all three levels. 
First, as noted above, the trial court found that a written 
contract did exist. The only evidence at trial supported the 
trial court's finding, and the existence of the contract was 
never challenged. Furthermore, Promax has failed to marshall the 
evidence supporting its assertion. Also, this issue is being 
raised for the first time on appeal; the Appellate Court cannot 
consider a matter which was not first brought before the trial 
court (Point I, supra). 
Second, the affirmative defense of statute of frauds must be 
pleaded or it is waived. Rule 8(c), UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
states: 
In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party 
shall set forth affirmatively . . . statute 
of frauds . . . and any other matter 
constituting an avoidance or affirmative 
defense. 
See also; W.W. & W.B. Gardner, Inc. v. Pappas, 24 Utah 2d 264, 
470 P.2d 252 (1970)(not pleading statute of frauds does not 
constitute a defense). In a similar case, the Utah Supreme Court 
stated: 
[T]he affirmative defense of the statute of 
frauds is being raised for the first time in 
this appeal, it was never pled below. This 
constitutes a violation of Rule 8(c) . . . 
The consequence of this procedural error is 
set forth in Rule 12(L), Utah R. Civ. P. 
which states that "[a] party waives all 
defenses and objections which he does not 
present either by motion . . . [or] in his 
answer or reply . . . " 
Phillips v. JCM Dev. Corp., 666 P.2d 876 (Utah 1983)(second 
bracket in original, third elipses in original, emphasis in 
original). Promax failed to raise the affirmative defense of 
statute of frauds in its pleading, or at trial, and therefore 
waived that defense. 
Promax alleges that it was not required to plead the 
affirmative defense, statute of frauds, in its answer to 
Mattsons' counterclaim because "ProMax was unaware that a written 
agreement existed or, that if a written agreement did exists, 
that is was defective." (Appellant's brief at p.21) This 
statement is untrue. Mattsons' counterclaim specifically states: 
82. On August 28, 1993, Curtis Johnson ("the 
buyer"), the President of Dynatek Sales 
and Leasing, made a written offer of 
$565,000 for the home and all its 
furnishings. 
* * * 
103. The realtors and Mr. Mattson also signed 
the offer for the house. 
(R. )(emphasis added). To now argue that ProMax was unaware of a 
written contract is blatant misrepresentation of the facts. Even 
if ProMax was unaware that a "written contract" existed, they at 
least knew that some kind of contract existed, and were therefore 
required to plead the statute of frauds as a defense. Having 
failed to do so, they have therefore waived that defense. The 
trial court's finding that a contract for sale existed, 
therefore, should be affirmed. 
Third, and finally, even if there had never been a written 
contract, and even if Plaintiff had raised the issue of statute 
of frauds in its pleadings, the trial court could have found, 
based on the evidence at trial, that plaintiff's actions 
constituted tortious interference with prospective economic 
relations, resulting in an identical judgment. 
It is undisputed that Plaintiff had its material men 
purposely file liens on Defendants' property so as to "burn their 
deal." Even if there were no written contract, Plaintiff's 
behavior constituted tortious interference with prospective 
business advantage. The resulting judgment would have been the 
same. 
In Leigh Furniture and Carpet Company v. T. Richard Isom 
Richard's Fine Furnishings, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982), the 
defendant had recovered against plaintiff based on the theory of 
interference with contract. On appeal the Supreme Court found 
that no contract existed and that the award could not be affirmed 
on the theory of interference with contract. However, the Court 
did sustain the award on the theory of interference with 
advantageous economic relations. In so doing the Court stated: 
However, the right of action for interference with a 
specific contract is but one instance, rather than the total 
class, of protections against wrongful interference with 
advantageous economic relations. [citations omitted]. We 
therefore proceed to consider whether the jury's verdict for 
Isom can be sustained on the basis of the related tort of 
interference with prospective economic relations. 
If so, we can affirm the judgment. Consistent with the 
well-settled principle that the appellant has the burden of 
demonstrating that any error has affected his substantial 
rights, Utah R. Civ. P. 61; Startin v. Madsen, 120 Utah 631, 
636, 237 P.2d 834. 836 (1951), we follow the authorities 
that exercise every reasonable presumption in favor of the 
validity of a general verdict. 
In the extant case, the lack of a written contract would not have 
affected the outcome of the judgment. The elements for 
prevailing under the theory of interference with prospective 
economic relations are: 
We recognize a common-law cause of action for intentional 
interference with prospective economic relations, and adopt 
the Oregon definition of this tort. Under this definition, 
in order to recover damages, the plaintiff must prove (1) 
that the defendant intentionally interfered with the 
plaintiff's existing or potential economic relations, (2) 
for an improper purpose or by improper means, (3) causing 
injury to the plaintiff. 
Id. The facts of this case clearly meet the requirements of the 
above test. Phil Bates, agent for Promax, "burned the deal." 
Whether there was a written contract is irrelevant to the outcome 
of the case. The Court's findings conclusions and judgment 
should, therefore, be affirmed. 
III. THE OFFER DID NOT EXPIRE PRIOR TO PROMAX TORTIOUSLY 
INTERFERING WITH MATTSONS' CONTRACT FOR SALE, AND 
PLAINTIFF RELIES ON FACTS NOT FOUND BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
Promax's next argument relies on facts never asserted at 
trial and never found by the trial court to be true. Promax 
asserts (1): "Mr. Johnson's offer to purchase the Mattson's home 
expired on August 30, 1993, without being accepted by the 
Mattsons" (Appellant's brief p.21); and (2) "Not only did Mr. 
Johnson, the prospective purchaser, testify in his affidavit that 
the liens were not the cause of the failed sale . . . " 
(Appellant's brief p.22). Not only did the court never find these 
facts to be true, but Mr. Johnson never testified at trial, nor 
did he submit an affidavit at trial. Promax's assertions are a 
blatant misrepresentation of the facts presented at trial. 
Furthermore, as already shown above, the trial court found 
that a contract existed (Point I, supra). Promax's argument, 
therefore, fails. 
IV. THE MECHANIC'S LIENS WERE INVALID AND IMPROPER. 
Promax also argues, again for the first time on appeal, that 
the liens were not filed improperly because the liens were filed 
according to statute. The appellate court cannot consider a new 
issue on appeal (Point 1, supra). In making this argument, 
Promax also misstates the standard of review. Promax believes 
the issue of a mechanic's lien is a question of law, when their 
issue is really questioning the trial court's findings of fact. 
The trial court's findings regarding the wrongfully filed liens 
were: 
24. Plaintiff, through Bates, told 
Defendants that Plaintiff "would kill 
their deal" if they did not use 
Plaintiff as their real estate agent in 
the sale of their home. . . . 
26. Because of Defendant's proper refusal to 
allow Plaintiff to act as agent in the 
sale of Defendant's home, Bates and 
Plaintiff had five material men and 
laborers wrongfully file liens against 
Defendant's home to scare off the buyer. 
(R. 406)(emphasis added). The trial court's findings were not 
that the liens were filed improper according to statute, but that 
the liens were wrongfully filed because it was done with the 
intent to interfere with a contractual relationship between 
Mattsons and Curtis Johnson. The trial court found the liens 
wrongful because the filing of the liens "were the sole reason 
that the buyer suddenly backed out of the contract to buy 
Mattsons's home." (R. 406). 
Again, Promax is questioning the findings of fact and the 
proper approach for appellate review was well explained by the 
Utah Court of Appeals: 
When an appellant is essentially challenging 
the legal sufficiency of the evidence, a 
clearly erroneous standard of appellate 
review applies. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
52(a) provides: "Findings of fact, whether 
oral or documentary shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard 
shall be given to the opportunity of the 
trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses." "A finding attacked as lacking 
adequate evidentiary support is deemed 
'clearly erroneous' only if we conclude that 
the finding is against the clear weight of 
the evidence." We review the evidence in a 
light most favorable to the trial court's 
findings and affirm if there is a reasonable 
basis for doing so. A prerequisite to an 
appellant's attack on findings of fact is the 
requirement that appellant marshall all the 
evidence in support of the findings in order 
to demonstrate "that the evidence, including 
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is 
insufficient to support the findings." 
Reinbold v. Utah Fun Shares, 850 P.2nd 487 (Ut. App. 
1993)(emphasis added). Promax has failed to marshall the 
evidence to show that the trial court's decision was erroneous. 
Further, a review of the testimony and evidence at trial shows 
the trial court's decision was sound: 
1. Mattson's testimony that Bates would 
kill the deal, and later admitted to 
Mattson that he did (R. 649-651). 
2. Riley's testimony that Bates would kill 
Mattson's deal and would do the same to 
her (R. 598-99). 
3. Bates' testimony that he did "burn the 
deal," but not in those words (R. 547). 
4. Testimony that the liens were filed in 
sequential order, and on the same form 
(R. 537-38). 
5. Testimony that the claim to such liens were 
already paid, and lien waivers obtained, (R. 652). 
Based on such evidence, the trial court's finding that Promax 
wrongfully filed the liens is not erroneous, and Promax7s 
argument fails because it is a new issue on appeal, the facts 
have not been marshalled, and the standard of review is improper. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT PHIL BATES DID 
CAUSE THE SALE TO FAIL BY TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE 
Promax argues that Curtis Johnson did not back out of the 
contract because of liens filed by Mr. Bates; however, this 
argument is again brought for the first time on appeal. The 
appellate court cannot consider an issue not brought before the 
trial court (Point I, supra). In support of this assertion, 
Promax relies on affidavits submitted after the trial, from 
biased witness, which were submitted in support of Promax's 
motion for a new trial. An affidavit of Curtis Johnson and 
testimony of Curtis Johnson was never presented at trail. 
Further, Promax alleges that Mattson perjured his testimony 
and the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to hear any 
additional evidence (See Point IX, infra). Promax is again 
arguing about the trial court's findings, and that such findings 
are erroneous (See Point III, supra). Promax has failed to 
marshall the evidence on this issue and merely restates evidence 
supporting their position even though it was not presented at 
trial. Reviewing the evidence at trial shows the trial court did 
not erroneously decide that Bates caused the sale to fail: 
1. Bates' testimony that he did "burn the 
deal," but not in those words (R. 547). 
2. Riley's testimony that Bates would kill 
Mattson's deal and would do the same to 
her (R. 598-600). 
3. Mattson's testimony there was a willing 
and able buyer (R. 645)• 
4. Mattson's testimony that Bates admitted 
he killed the deal (R.650-51). 
5. Bates7 testimony that there was a 
willing and able buyer (R. 732-33). 
6. Testimony that the sale did not go 
through because of fear of the liens and 
litigation (R. 598-99). 
7. Culley Davis' testimony that the deal 
fell through because a commission wasn't 
paid to Mr. Bates (R. 766). 
The evidence as outlined shows a clear basis for the trial court 
to find that Mr. Bates did cause the sale of the home to fail. 
Promax has failed to marshall such evidence and their argument 
does not stand, and the trial court's findings should be 
affirmed. 
VI. THE COURT AWARD OF DAMAGES WAS NOT EXCESSIVE, BUT WAS FAR 
BELOW WHAT MATTSONS SHOULD HAVE RECEIVED. 
Promax argues that the trial court's awarded of $170,000.00 
for tortious interference with contract was excessive because the 
court erred in finding that the value of the home was $390,000. 
Promax's argument fails for the following reasons: (1) Promax has 
again misstated the standard of review. Promax is challenging a 
finding of fact (that the value of the home upon completion was 
$390,000) and not a question of law. A trial court's finding of 
fact cannot be set aside unless it is found to be clearly 
erroneous. (Point IV, supra). (2) When challenging a trial 
court's finding of fact, Plaintiff is required to marshall the 
evidence on appeal, and Plaintiff has failed to do so. (Point IV, 
supra). (3) All of the evidence presented at trial supports the 
court's finding, and there is none to the contrary. (4) Even if 
the only evidence presented at trial was Mattson's testimony, it 
was the court's prerogative to believe him, and his detailed 
involvement with the construction of his home allowed the court 
to rely on his testimony. 
Among the evidences presented to the court regarding the 
value of the home at the time of completion are the following: 
1. Bates testified that he signed an 
insurance contract listing the completed 
value of the home at $330,000. (R. 585) 
(Exhibit 29) . 
2. Culley Davis testified that the home was 
worth twice the amount of the mortgage 
(R. 766), and the mortgage amount was 
$190,200 (R. 455, 637). 
3. Bates testified that he insured the home 
at a value of $165,000 even after the 
home was completed on August 15, 1993 
(R.580-81). 
4* Mattson's testimony that the value of 
the home was probably $390,000 or 
$395,000 at the time of completion (R. 
678-79). 
Promax never challenged the value of the home at trial. In fact, 
Promax's witnesses all agreed that the value was approximately 
$390,000.00. Issues presented for the first time on appeal may 
not be considered by the Court. Now on appeal, Promax brings 
these issues to the appellate court, for the first time, which 
cannot be decided on appeal. Plaintiff argues that Mattson only 
gave the actual cost of building the house and did not include 
cost-savings; however, the argument is irrelevant because the 
evidence shows testimony was about the value of the home and not 
the cost. Further, Promax states as evidence figures which were 
never brought before the trial court, figures never testified or 
brought by affidavit until Promax's motion for a partial new 
trial. Promax never shows that the trial court's decision was 
clearly erroneous based on the evidence presented at trial. 
Next, Promax argues that Mattson was not qualified to give 
an evaluation of the value of the property. However, this is a 
finding of fact, supported by the case in which Promax cites 
stating an owner may not be able to give an opinion as to value, 
unless he is familiar with facts which give the property value. 
(Appellant's Brief at p.26). Phil Bates himself states for pages 
of the trial transcript that Mattson was heavily involved with 
the building process; for example: 
Q. How was Matt Mattson involved in the 
construction of this home which would be 
something in addition to what you'd have in a 
case where someone's just picking colors or 
things like that? A. Matt was involved more 
than the normal home buyer at the very first 
on input from the plans . . . 
(R. 716), and the trial court recognized this testimony that 
Mattson was basically a co-contractor(R. 718). The trial court 
also stated: 
[Mattson] can testify as to the value of his 
own property . . . He has an opinion. It can 
be based on a variety of factors. As the 
owner, he can tell us what his opinion as to 
the value is. 
(R. 678). Promax essentially seeks to have the trial court's 
finding set aside simply because they disagree with the value 
stated by Mattson. However, no evidence suggests the trial court 
abused its discretion in believing Mattson's testimony regarding 
the home's value. 
VII. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY POUND THAT A FIXED COST 
CONTRACT EXISTED BETWEEN PROMAX AND MATTSONS. 
Promax asserts that the trial court erred in finding that a 
fixed cost contract existed between Promax and Mattsons. 
Promax's argument fails for the following reasons: (1) Promax 
again fails to properly present that there was an erroneous 
decision by the trial court, and they do not marshall the 
evidence for proper review (Point IV, supra); (2) the evidence 
before the trial court shows the trial court did not make an 
erroneous decision that a fixed cost contract existed; and (3) 
Promax again states evidence which was never before the trial 
court for the court to consider, and a new issue before the 
appellate court may not be determined (Point I, supra). 
Promax basically restates the evidence which supports their 
position, they fail to marshall any evidence, and at one point 
state: ,fIn sum, the trial court took Mr. Mattson's word over Mr. 
Bates' word and Mr Barraclough's testimony" (Appellant brief 
p. 33). Promax fails to recognize that their statement is exactly 
the court's prerogative in determining facts. The Utah Supreme 
Court stated that when there is conflicting testimony: "it [is] 
the prerogative of the trial court to choose whom [it] will 
believe" Riaale v. Daines MFG. Co., 463 P.2d 1 (Utah 1969); 
further, the trial court "defers to the 'advantaged position of 
the trial judge who sees and hears the witnesses." Parks 
Enters., Inc. v. New Century Realty, Inc., 652 P.2d 918 (Utah 
1982). In this case, the trial court made it clear whose 
testimony the court believed by stating: 
The testimony presented on behalf of the 
plaintiff is too inconsistent and 
contradictory to be persuasive. Based upon 
the foregoing, as well as other evidence 
produced at trial, this Court finds that the 
parties had a fixed price contract for 
$190,200 . . . 
(R. 778). The other evidence produced at trial included: 
1. Baraclough's testimony there was a 
certain dollar figure, and that his 
testimony had change in court versus a 
telephone conversation (R. 479-80). 
2. Riley's testimony that in a similar 
transaction Bates promised a fixed price 
contract, then charged additional 
amounts (R. 600-601). 
3. Kumaraa's testimony that in a similar 
transaction Bates promised a fixed price 
contract, then charged additional 
amounts (R.613-14). 
4. Mattson's testimony he received a loan 
for the total cost of the home, $190,200 
(R.637-38), that he was told the price 
would never be over $190,200 (R.642), 
and that he was assured by Bates that 
they would not go above budget (R. 643). 
5. Testimony that a specific price was in 
mind, about $190,200 (R. 755-56). 
Reviewing the testimony shows the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in determining a fixed price contract existed between 
Mattson and Promax. Promax also tries to bring additional 
evidence that was never before the trial court, except after 
trial in a motion for a new trial (Point IX, infra), and 
therefore this new issue should be disregarded by the appellate 
court, and the findings of the trial court be affirmed. 
VIII. THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT IS SUPPORTED BY THE 
EVIDENCE. 
Promax next argues in Points A through L that the findings 
of the trial court are not supported by the evidence. However, 
Promax's argument fails for the following reasons: (1) Promax 
again fails to properly prepare the argument for appellate review 
by not marshalling the evidence and showing the findings to be 
clearly erroneous; (2) the point were already brought up earlier 
in their brief and properly address by Mattsons; and (3) the 
issues are irrelevant, or at most de minimis, to the outcome of 
the trial court's decision. 
Point A: States the trial court misstated the construction 
cost by one-half of the lot price. This point is irrelevant 
because the trial court's damages are based on the home7 value, 
not the cost. 
Point B: States Mattsons did not request a written 
contract. This argument is irrelevant, and Promax makes no point 
to this argument. 
Point C. D, F, G, H, I and K have already been addressed. 
Point E: States that change orders need not be written. 
This argument is irrelevant to the outcome of the trial court. 
Point J; States there was an error in cost overruns. This 
issue is irrelevant and moot because the amended findings cleared 
I 
up the discrepancy. 
Point L: States there was no stipulation to cost overruns. 
However, there was no counter-evidence presented at trial, and 
Promax fails to marshall any evidence to show how the trial 
court's decision is clearly erroneous. 
IX. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED PROMAX'S MOTION FOR A 
PARTIAL NEW TRIAL TO TAKE ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE. 
Promax argues they are entitled to present additional 
evidence which was not presented at trial because they filed 
their motion timely; and because the motion should be granted 
because Mattson perjured his testimony, that Promax did not see 
the Earnest Money Agreement before trial, that Mattsons' 
counterclaim was too long, because Promax feels the damages are 
excessive, and because their evidence justifies a partial new 
trial. Promax's argument fails for the following reasons: (1) 
Promax fails to establish the appropriate standard of review for 
the appellate court, and marshall the evidence to justify their 
argument; (2) The findings of the trial court, as established in 
above arguments, show there is a substantial basis for the court 
to believe Mattson's testimony; and (3) Promax had the 
opportunity to bring evidence, pursue discovery, and prepare 
their defense to Mattson's counterclaim before the trial came to 
a close. 
When appealing a trial court's denial of a motion for a new 
trial, the appellate court will: 
[R]everse only iff viewing the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the prevailing 
party, we conclude that the evidence is 
insufficient to support the verdict. When a 
challenge to the denial of [a motion for new 
trial] amounts to an attack on the 
sufficiency of the evidence, the appealing 
party 'must marshall the evidence in support 
of the verdict and then demonstrate that the 
evidence is insufficient when viewed in a 
light most favorable to the verdict.' 
Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828 (Utah 1992). In their 
appeal, Promax has again failed to marshall the evidence in 
support of the trial court's decision and shown that the decision 
was insufficient—even in a light more favorable to the trial 
court's decision. Promax basically sets forth their testimony 
which supports their position by referring to the arguments 
earlier in their appellant brief, and then stating that Mattson's 
testimony must therefore be perjured. As previously argued, 
there was enough basis presented in trial for the trial court to 
rule in Mattson favor. Further, in the Heslop case, the Utah 
Supreme Court was presented with a similar presentation of 
unmarshalled evidence and favorable arguments for the appealing 
party, and the court stated: 
[W]e conclude that the [Appellant] has not 
made the necessary showing. Although the 
[Appellant] made an admirable listing of 
evidence presented in the case upon which the 
verdict was or could have been based, the 
[Appellant]'s arguments merely refute the 
credibility of this evidence and of 
[Appellee] as a witness. The [Appellant] 
does not base its argument upon the 
insufficiency of the evidence supporting the 
verdict. Instead it relies on other, 
contradictory evidence that support's the 
[Appellant]'s position . . . we [therefore] 
will not invade the province of jurors to 
determine [Appellee]'s credibility or to 
reverse their decision. 
Heslop, 839 P.2d 828 (Utah 1992). Because Promax does not meet 
this requirement, the trial court's decision not to grant a 
partial new trial should be affirmed. 
Although Promax fails to marshall the evidence, the 
arguments as presented above show there was sufficient evidence 
for the trial court to decide in Mattsons' favor. 
Finally Promax believes Mattsons' counterclaim was too long, 
and they didn't receive appropriate discovery. As stated above, 
there was sufficient notice in the counterclaim that there was a 
written agreement between Mattson and Curtis Johnson (Point II, 
supra). In a similar case, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
[Appellant]'s counsel did make a request for 
production of [documents] but never sought to 
compel it, never moved for a continuance 
based on the [Appellee]'s failure to produce 
it, and did not explore the subject during 
cross-examination. The [Appellant]'s counsel 
could have obtained the same information by 
propounding interrogatories to the 
[Appellee]. He did not. 
Lembach v. Cox, 639 P.2d 197 (Utah 1981). There was no surprise 
to Promax, the pleadings stated all the claims which Mattsons 
wish to pursue, and Promax cannot now claim there was not enough 
time to present their witnesses or pursue adequate discovery. 
The trial court's decision to deny the motion for a partial new 
trial should therefore be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs consistently misstates the standard of review 
and fails to marshal the evidence. The trial court's findings 
are overwhelmingly supported by the evidence at trial. At trial 
Plaintiff either failed to challenge the evidence presented or 
their witnesses were not believed by the trial court. The trial 
court's findings of fat, conclusions of law and judgment should, 
therefore, be affirmed. 
CROSS APPEAL BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
'the Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3) (j). This matter was 
assigned to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to § 78-2-2(4) of 
the Utah Code. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD 
OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Statement of the issue: Did the trial cost err in not 
deciding that Mattsons were entitled to the benefit of their 
bargain (an award of $140,000.00) when the trial court found 
there existed a fixed cost contract between Promax and 
Mattsons, and Promax breach the contract by exceeding the 
contract by $140,000.00? 
Standard of Review: Whether Defendant's were entitled to 
the benefit of their bargain is a question of law. 
Conclusions of law are accorded no particular deference, but 
are reviewed for correctness. Scharf v. BMG Corp. 700 P.2d 
1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
Statement of the issue: Did the trial court err in not 
assessing punitive damages against Promax when the trial 
court found that Promax tortiously interfered with a 
contractual relationship between Mattsons and Curtis Johnson 
by wrongfully filing liens against Mattsons' property. 
Standard of review: An award of punitive damages is 
generally a question of fact within the sound discretion of 
the trial court, and will not be disturbed absent an abuse 
of discretion. Sampson v. Richins. 770 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 
1989). 
Statement of the issue: Did the trial court err in not 
awarding attorney's fees to Mattsons when the trial court 
found that Promax tortiously interfered with a contractual 
relationship between Mattsons and Curtis Johnson by 
wrongfully filing liens against Mattsons' property. 
Standard of review: An award of attorney's fees is 
generally a question of fact within the sound discretion of 
the trial court, and will not be disturbed absent an abuse 
of discretion. Salmon v. Davis County. 916 P.2d 890 (Utah 
1996). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
None. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The statement of the case and statement of the facts are as 
presented in Appellee response brief above, 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The trial found that Plaintiff agreed to build the Mattsons' 
home for a fix cost of $190,200.00. The Court found that the 
Mattsons eventually were forced to pay $330f000.00. The trial 
court erred in not awarding the Mattsons $140,000, the difference 
between the fixed price contract and the total cost the Mattsons 
had to pay because of Plaintiff's breach of the contract. 
The trial court erred in not awarding Mattsons punitive 
damages and attorney's fees when Promax's actions were a 
malicious intent to interfere in a contractual relationship. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT AWARDING THE MATTSONS $140,000, 
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE FIXED COST CONTRACT PRICE, 
$190,200.00, AND THE TOTAL AMOUNT THE MATTSONS WERE FORCED 
TO PAY, $330,000.00. 
The trial court found that there existed a fixed cost 
contract between Mattsons and Promax to build a home for the 
amount of $190,200 (R. 778). The trial court also found that the 
amount Mattsons overpaid in breach of the fixed cost contract was 
(by stipulation at trial) $140,000. (R. 778). However, the trial 
court did not find awarded the Mattsons the difference between 
the amount they paid and the contract price of $190,200. 
Marshalling all the evidence in support of the trial court's 
decision is as follows: 
MR. SMITH: "Judge, there was one question. 
The ruling was that there was a malicious 
interference with contract responsible for 
$170,000. I assume that takes into account 
the cost overruns; is that correct? 
THE COURT: The $170,000 is the amount of the 
loss for the sale, and as far as the cost 
overruns are concerned, I conclude that the 
parties received what they paid for. 
Therefore, in my estimation there is no 
damage claim back for that sum. . . . 
(R. 779-780). The evidence presented at trial, however, cannot 
justify the court's conclusion. There was a fixed price 
contract, that contract was breached by Promax to the economic 
detriment of Mattsons, and Mattsons were forced to pay, form 
their own funds, $140,000.00 more than what they had bargained. 
The Court of Appeals explained the general nature of contract 
damages as: 
Courts generally measure contract damages by 
the lost benefit of the bargain, and 
accordingly, "damages are properly measured 
by the amount necessary to place the 
nonbreaching party in as good as a position 
as if the contract had been performed." 
Anesthesiologists Assocs. of Ogden v. St. Benedict, 852 P.2d 1030 
(Ct. App. 1993)(emphasis added). Mattsons should therefore be 
entitled to the benefit of the fixed cost contract, which should 
be an award of $140,000.00 for the overruns paid out-of-pocket by 
Mattsons. 
Reviewing the evidence and the trial court's statement shows 
that not awarding Mattsons the benefit of their fixed priced 
contract bargain was clearly erroneous* 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT AWARDING PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
AND ATTORNEY'S FEES AGAINST PROMAX WHEN THE TRIAL COURT 
FOUND THEY MALICIOUSLY INTERFERED WITH THE CONTRACT 
BETWEEN MATTSONS AND CURTIS JOHNSON. 
The trial court found that Phil Bates: "maliciously and with 
intent to harm interfered with defendants' prospective economic 
advantage by directly thwarting defendant's opportunity to sell 
their home . . . " (R. 779). However, although there was 
malicious intent found in Promax's action, the trial court did 
not award any punitive damages or attorney's fees; in fact, no 
evidence can be marshalled to support the trial court's decision. 
Generally, when a contract dispute sounds in tort (malicious 
intent to interfere with one's economic advantage) a person can 
recover punitive damages, and attorney's fees. Peterson v. 
Browning, 832 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1992). Because there was malicious 
intent on the part of Promax and the trial court does not mention 
punitive damages, it was error for the court not to assess 
punitive damages against Promax. 
CONCLUSION 
Because Mattsons are entitled to the benefit of their 
bargain, the trial court should have awarded Mattsons $140,000 
for Promax's breach of contract, in addition to the $193,000.00 
for tortious interference of contract and defective workmanship. 
Also, because Promax's actions were done with malicious intent, 
Mattsons should receive an award of punitive damages and 
attorney's fees. Mattsons therefore request that, in addition to 
the $193,000.00 already awarded by the trial court, judgment be 
entered against Plaintiff and in favor of Defendants for 
$140,000.00 for breach of contract. The issue of punitive 
damages and attorney's fees should be remanded to the trial 
court for proper determination of the amount. 
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